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20.1 Introduction
Producers use different information when making decisions concerning their eco-
nomic activities. Past trends, outcomes in related markets, media reports, weather,
and published forecasts are some of the information that farmers use in their
resource allocation decisions (Just and Rausser 1981). The intrinsic feature of
agriculture—the lag between production decision and output realization—makes
these types of information indispensable to agricultural producers. Besides, agricul-
tural production is inherently stochastic due to weather shocks, pest infestations,
and other shocks, which affect the general market supply condition and therefore
prices. Farmers need to form their expectations of market prices and potential yield
for the upcoming harvesting season in order to make their production decisions.
They invest in accessing and processing price and other market information, which
they believe affects prices at harvesting time. This study assesses the information
sources relevant to smallholder farmers and how efficiently farmers utilize the
available information in their price expectation formations. This is important since
modeling price expectations is an integral part of any agricultural supply response
study (Moschini and Hennessy 2001).
In this study, we seek to empirically test the impact of access to information on
the level of investment in information acquisition. Access to information is used
synonymously with low costs of acquiring information to forecast future prices,
which is notably a continuous rather than a discrete concept. Whereas ownership
of information and communications technologies (ICT) and distance to markets
serve as a measure of access to information (or costs of acquiring information),
we use farmer realized price forecasting errors as a measure of the outcome
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variable of interest. In particular, we seek to address the research question whether
access to information (i.e., access to ICT and grain markets) results in a smaller
price forecasting error of smallholder farmers in rural Ethiopia. Analyzing the
distribution of smallholders’ price expectations relative to realized prices assists
policymakers in delivering information on price outlook and price risk management
strategies. The main findings indicate that smallholders who have access to ICT
and who reside closer to major grain markets are more likely to have smaller price
forecasting errors. Public investment in both information and physical infrastructure
that reduces the cost of accessing information is therefore vital for improving the
precision of farmers’ price expectations.
Several approaches have been applied to model expectations of agricultural
producers. These include naïve expectation (Ezekiel 1938), whereby expected prices
are assumed to be equal to the latest observed prices; adaptive expectation (Nerlove
1958), whereby farmers are assumed to revise their expectations depending on past
errors; and rational expectation (Muth 1961), which assumes that expectations are
consistent with the underlying market structure and that economic agents make
efficient use of all available information. Other research has focused on modeling
supply response using a quasi-rational price expectation (Holt and McKenzie 2003),
which is consistent with price prediction from a reduced-form dynamic regression
equation. Futures prices have also been used as proxies for price expectations
(Gardner 1976).
Acquiring information is a common and critical feature of all of these expectation
hypotheses. Because searching for and processing information are costly (Stigler
1961), it is unlikely that producers make use of all available information to form
their price expectations (Orazem and Miranowski 1986). This is even more so
in the context of subsistent smallholder farmers with limited access to credit and
capital. Farmers therefore gather and process price and other market information
that could potentially improve their price forecasts the most. A rational farmer
invests in acquiring market information to the extent that the expected marginal
benefit (in terms of more accurate price expectation) is greater or equal to the
marginal cost of investing in acquiring the information. Ownership of information
assets, such as a radio, a television, and a phone, and proximity to grain markets
could potentially reduce the costs of investing in acquiring information. The
government could also improve market efficiency by lowering the costs of access
to information by providing market information as a public good through organized
market information systems.
There is a large body of literature that investigates the effect of market infor-
mation systems (MIS) or ICTs on the economic performances of farmers, traders,
and consumers. Most of the existing empirical work has focused on the impact of
MIS or ICTs on price dispersion between markets and sellers (Aker and Fafchamps
2015; Jensen 2007), price asymmetry between traders and farmers (Svensson
and Yanagizawa 2009), traders’ search behavior (Tack and Aker 2014), farmers
bargaining power and selling prices (Mitchell 2011), consumption expenditures
(Labonne and Chase 2009), and farmers’ marketing choices (Tadesse and Bahiigwa
2015), among others (see Nakasone et al. 2014 for a recent review). The empirical
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evidence has been mixed regarding the effect of improved market price information
on prices at micro level. Yet, there seems to be little evidence arguing against
its positive effect on lowering price dispersion and search costs and improving
agricultural market performance at a macro-scale (Nakasone et al. 2014). Access
to better information through ownership of mobile phones, a radio, or a television
could potentially assist farmers in making a more informed price expectation. This,
in turn, helps them to make better decisions in terms of their crop choices, the
amount to plant, land management efforts, and the amount and type of investment
that they undertake in each cropping season. The present study therefore uses
primary data from smallholders in Ethiopia to empirically evaluate the impact of
access to information on farmers’ price expectations.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: The following section
presents a theoretical model that studies the importance of market information in
improving the price signal for farmers. Section 20.3 outlines the empirical model,
the data, and some descriptive statistics. Section 20.4 presents and discusses the
econometric results, and the last section concludes this chapter.
20.2 Theoretical Model
We employ a simple theoretical model to understand farmers’ decision behaviors
on production and information acquisition. The model consists of two stages: a
production decision (second stage) and a decision about investment in information
acquisition (first stage). The model is solved by backward induction. We therefore
start with the second stage.
Consider a farmer who decides on the output level y given a quadratic production
cost c.y/ D ˛y2. Crop prices are assumed to be random with mean  and variance
2. Because production costs accrue before harvesting, the farmer maximizes
discounted revenue from crop sales. With a discount rate of r (cost of capital), the




1 C r  c.y/

D E Œ p y
1 C r  c.y/: (20.1)
The first-order condition is EŒ p
1Cr D c0.y/ D 2˛y. With rational expectations (i.e.,
E Œ p D ) the optimal production under uncertainty is given by y D 
2˛.1Cr/ .
Substituting y* into the expected profit function yields:












where the subscript v on v denotes profits under volatile prices. In case of no
ex-ante uncertainty about prices, E Œ p D p, the optimal production is y D p
2˛.1Cr/ ,
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and thus the expected profit c conditional on the fact that the farmer knows the

































 D 2 C 2, we obtain






Thus, farmers with access to perfect information on the harvest price are expected
to have on average higher profits than farmers with uncertainty. The discrepancy
increases with the magnitude of the uncertainty (variance 2).
In the first stage, the farmer chooses their level of investment in information
acquisition, which results in acquisition of a perfect price signal regarding har-
vesting prices with probability  or no signal with probability 1  . With the
probability 1  , the price remains as uncertain as it would be without any
investment in information acquisition (i.e., the farmer receives no signal regarding
harvesting prices). The cost of investing in information acquisition is given by a
twice differentiable function ˇk(), where k.0/ D 0; k0 > 0; k00 > 0; k.1/ D 1
and ˇ is a scaling factor. Hence,  measures the quality of the signal or the level of
investment to obtain a perfect signal. The information investment decision involves
choosing a  2 Œ0; 1 such that the expected profit—which is a weighted sum of
the expected profit with certainty EŒc and the expected profit with uncertainty
EŒv—is maximized after the costs of information acquisition are netted out, thus:
max2Œ0;1 E Œc C .1  / E Œv  ˇk ./ : (20.5)
Given the profit in the second stage, the farmer chooses the optimal level of
investment in information * to maximize the expected profit in the first stage. After
substituting the expected profit from the second stage into Eq. (20.5), the first-order





D k0 	 : (20.6)
Proposition 1 The optimal investment in information * increases in 2 and
decreases in r, a and ˇ. Thus, investment in information acquisition increases with
price volatility, whereas it is negatively correlated with discount rates, costs of
acquiring information, and production costs.
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.1Cr/2 4˛ˇ k00./ > 0,
d
d˛ D  
2
.1Cr/2 4˛2ˇ k00./ < 0,
d
dˇ D  
2
.1Cr/2 4˛ˇ2 k00./ < 0
and d

dr D  2
2
.1Cr/3 4˛ˇ k00./ < 0.
The magnitude of the forecasting error V of the price expectation formation of
the farmer can be measured by the expected squared deviations of the expected




. The farmer’s expected
price pe, in turn, depends on the level of information acquisition  and is pe D
pr C .1  / . It is the weighted sum of the realized price (revealed at probability
) and the unconditional mean  of the random distribution of the price. Substituting
pe into V, we obtain V D E
h
..1  / .pr  //2
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D 2 is the (unconditional) variance of the price.
Corollary 1 The magnitude of a farmer’s forecasting error V (measured as the
squared deviation of the farmer’s expected price conditional on the information
acquired from the realized price) is V D .1  /22. It increases with 2 and
decreases with .
One particular implication of the corollary is that in case of no information
acquisition, that is,  D 0, the forecasting error is just the unconditional variance
of the price series. For full information acquisition,  D 1, the forecasting error
will be zero. As V decreases with , the impact of the structural parameters on the
forecasting error in the optimum V* has a sign opposite to that of the impact of these
parameters on *. The exception is 2, which influences both the optimal * and
V* in opposite directions.1
This chapter employs empirical analyses to validate the theoretical model and
to determine the sign and magnitude of the impacts of the structural parameters
on the accuracy of price expectation formation. Because it is nearly impossible
to observe investment in acquiring information per se, we explain the size of the
price expectation error (or realized price forecasting error) with empirical data. The
structural model parameters are linked to our empirical data as indicated in the last
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d2 from proposition 1
into the derivative of V with respect to 2. As can be easily verified, @V

@2
> 0 for sufficiently small
values of 2 and @V

@2
< 0 for sufficiently large values of 2.
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Cost of information ˇ  .ˇ/ < 0 V .ˇ/ > 0 Ownership of ICT, years of
schooling, distance to market,
distance to extension agents’
office
Discount rate r .r/ < 0 V.r/ > 0 Discount rate, years of
schooling
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20.3 Methods
20.3.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics
Data for this study were obtained through a household survey. A random sample
of 415 rural smallholders were selected from seven villages out of four different
districts of Ethiopia, namely Kersa, Shashemene, Ada’a, and Debre Birhan Zuria.2
Adele Keke is a kebele3 selected from Kersa district and households in this village
trade with the adjacent towns of Dire-Dawa, Harar, and Aweday. Smallholders in
this kebele produce staple crops, typically corn and sorghum, and cash crops, like
chat4 and potato. We also interviewed households from four neighboring kebeles
at the Debre Birhan Zuria district, which is 120 km northeast of Addis Ababa.
The town of Debre Birhan is a nearby market for their grain production, which
typically consists of barley, wheat, and horse beans, among others. Sirbana Godeti
is a kebele that was selected in the Ada’a district and it is the major supplier of
teff to the surrounding and Addis Ababa markets. Having relatively fertile soil,
smallholders in this area also produce several leguminous crops and vegetables.
2The households in our sample were those selected for the widely used Ethiopian Rural Household
Survey (EHRS), and detailed information on sampling techniques can be found from Dercon and
Hoddinott (2004).
3A kebele is the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia.
4Chat is a perennial cash crop and a mild stimulant that is commonly used in the southern and
eastern parts of Ethiopia.
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Finally, we interviewed households from Turfe Ketchema, which is located about
12 km northeast from the town of Shashemene, where most of their marketing are
conducted. The main crops that the smallholders in this survey area produce include
potatoes, corn, wheat, barley, and teff.
The survey was conducted in April and May 2013, which was immediately before
or at the onset of planting for the main “meher” season of 2014. This helped us
obtain good information on planting time prices. Furthermore, the dataset provided
detailed information on household demographics, asset holdings, production and
consumption, purchases and sales, seasonal prices, information sources, among
others. Data on sowing time prices from the nearby grain markets were obtained
from the central statistical agency (CSA) of Ethiopia. Grain prices for the then
upcoming harvesting prices, which were not known at the time of our survey, are
obtained from three different enumerators who travelled to the respective markets
to collect price information.
Following the liberalization of markets in Ethiopia in the early 1990s, prices
have not only served as an incentive for farmers to produce more, but they have
also become less predictable. Consequently, recent food price volatility has posed
additional challenges to farmers in their production decisions. Information regarding
input and output price developments, weather conditions, and input availability
are hence crucial for the farmer to make a better production decision. Based on
the survey data, most of the smallholder households perceive prices as highly
unpredictable. About 85 % of the households reported that output prices were likely
to increase in the next one year, whereas the other 11 % indicated that prices would
have declined. Although most of the farmers (87 %) reported that changes in output
prices (in a year) were more likely to range from a decrease by half to an increase by
twice of the amount they predicted, the remaining households reported that prices
could be outside this range.
Farmers form their price expectations based on information that they have access
to. We asked the respondents two similar but subtly different questions regarding
their sources of price information. First, we wanted to know the major sources
of information for the market prices of their crops. Second, we asked them a
more specific question with regard to what information they observe to predict the
harvesting time price of the crop they chose to cultivate. Figure 20.1 shows the major
responses. There are three main sources of price information for rural households
in Ethiopia. Most of the smallholder farmers (54 %) visited close-by markets to sell
or buy products and thereby gather price information for the commodities they are
interested in, whereas about 45 % of them got price information from their fellow
farmers. About two-thirds of the households owned either a radio (57 %) or a mobile
phone (66 %), or a television (8 %), and about a quarter of the rural households
reported using these ICT tools as their sources of output price information. The
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Fig. 20.1 Primary sources of price information (left) and relevant information for price expecta-
tion formation of smallholders (right) Note: respondents were allowed to give multiple responses
descriptive statistics also indicated that the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX)
has not done enough to reach out rural smallholder farmers with price information.5
An interesting observation is that about half of the smallholders form their har-
vesting time price expectations based on the currently available price information.
About a fifth of the respondents also considered prices from the past harvesting
period in forming their price expectation. This may suggest that these households
form their price expectations in line with the adaptive or naïve price expectation
formation hypothesis. This is consistent with Chavas (2000), which indicated that
close to half of the US beef markets were associated with the naïve expectation
hypothesis. Nevertheless, other information such as weather, input prices, and
central wholesale prices were reported by the smallholder farmers in our sample
as relevant information in forming price expectation.
Subject to their access to information and their ability in data processing, farmers
make their price predictions for the next harvesting period. The better the access
farmers have to relevant price information, the more precise their price predictions
are expected to be. This, in turn, results in a more efficient allocation of production
resources. Table 20.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the smallholders in our
sample, highlighting household characteristics, asset holdings, and other variables
that could potentially affect farmers’ data gathering and processing abilities that, in
turn, influence their price expectation formations.
The summary statistics in Table 20.2 show a lot of similarities among the
households from the four survey districts. On average, the household heads were
in their mid-50s, and greater than two-third of them were married and male. The
average family size (6.1) is slightly greater than the average household size in rural
Ethiopia, which is 5.1 according to the household consumption and expenditure
survey in 2010/2011 (CSA 2012). Although about 55 % of the overall household
5Established in 2008 as a partnership between market actors, members of the exchange, and the
government, the ECX is a marketing system that, among other things, aims to disseminate real-time
market information to all market players.
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heads had some literacy skills through formal or informal education, the average
family head had completed only the second grade. The smallholders in the sample
had relatively large discount rates (46 %), which indicate severe liquidity problems.
We measured discount rate using a survey question that elicits the minimum amount
of money that a household head would have to be given in 6 months time in order
to make them no different relative to a fixed amount given to them today.
The total land owned by the average smallholder was about 1.68 ha: smallholders
in Debre Birhan district had, on average, slightly greater than 2 ha of land, whereas
those in Kersa had slightly less than a hectare of land. The average per capita farm
size was less than half a hectare. Besides, ownership of information assets such as
mobile phone, radio, and television are very important in obtaining market, rainfall,
and other information that could improve households’ production decisions. The
data showed that about 80 % of the smallholders owned at least one ICT tool.6
Other indicators of access to market and information include distances from
basic facilities. For instance, smallholder farmers are located on average 3 km away
from an all-weather road and 10 km from a nearby grain market. Thus, the average
farmer needs to walk about 1 and 2 h to access these facilities, respectively. As
agriculture is the main activity in all districts, it is not surprising that off-farm
income contributes less than 10 % of the households’ incomes. The degree of
commercialization (market share of grains), as measured by the share of output
sale from total production, is negligible in Kersa and Debre Birhan districts. This is
mainly because chat is the main cash crop in Kersa, and sale of livestock is common
in the latter.7
20.3.2 Empirical Model
We employed an econometric model to test part of the above theoretical model with
the described household survey data. More specifically, we empirically assessed fac-
tors that determine the quality of the price signal, for example, whether households
with better or cheaper access to information have more accurate price expectations.
Our presumption was that a better price signal, as explained in the theoretical model,
implies a more precise price expectation. To this end, we identified relevant variables
that affect the precision of smallholders in their expectation formation. We obtained
data on smallholders’ expectations of harvesting season prices at planting time. This
6In this chapter, ICT ownership is the same as ownership of any of the three ICT assets, namely
radio, television, or mobile phone.
7We calculated the market shares based on total sale and production of the six crops, namely teff,
wheat, corn, sorghum, barley, and horse beans to be consistent with our empirical analysis.
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allowed us to compute a deviation of farmers’ expected prices (pe) from realized
harvesting period output prices .pr or ptC1/ and use the deviation as a proxy for
the quality of the price signal (i.e., as a measure of investment into information
acquisition). Suppose PE denotes a measure of the price signal quality (henceforth
prediction error), which is related to the variable V in the theoretical model. A
simple model to explain prediction error for a typical farmer i can be specified as:
PEi D ˛ C  ICTi C Mi C X0ˇ C !i; (20.7)
where PE is the deviation of each farmer’s expected prices from the realized market
prices—the outcome variable of interest; and the cost of information acquisition
is captured by the two key variables of interest ICT and M. While ICT refers to
ownership of information assets (radio, television, and phone), M refers to distance
to markets. Both variables capture costs of acquiring information. X refers to a
vector of all other explanatory variables that could potentially affect investment in
information acquisition (and thus the level of precision in price expectation), such
as household characteristics, discount rate, farm size, household wealth, and years
of schooling; !i is an error term; and ˛,  , ˇ are parameters to be estimated.
As noted in footnote 6, we used ownership of the abovementioned ICT tools as
one of the proxies for access to information. In other words, we expect farmers to
use their radios, televisions, or phones to access better information on variables that
influence harvest-time prices, suggesting beneficial effect on their price forecasting
ability. There are at least two concerns with this assumption. First, it is possible
that farmers use the ICT tools for purposes other than accessing information (e.g.,
for luxury purposes). Richer farmers, who tend to have more of these information
assets, can have better price forecasts based on other channels. Second, there is a
possibility that farmers who do not own these information assets share common
intrinsic characteristics, such as poor farming skills and management abilities,
which are unlikely to be affected by having better market information.
We have taken a few measures to account for these issues. First, we controlled
for covariates, such as the level of education, age, wealth proxy variables, and
other farmer characteristics, to take into consideration farming experiences and
management abilities. Second, we controlled for a variable that captures access to
price information, which is an interaction between ownership of ICT and whether
farmers use any of the ICT tools as a source of price information. It is worth noting
here that farmers may (and are expected to) use their information assets to access
more than just price information. This in turn may affect their price prediction.
Therefore, ownership of ICT tools remains our main explanatory variable of interest
that serves as a proxy to “access to information.” Lastly, we calculated household-
specific average crop yield for our sample farmers using data from previous rounds
of the Ethiopian rural household survey (ERHS). We specifically computed the
average crop yield from the crop seasons of the ERHS data collected in 2004,
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2009, and from our survey in 2013. If ownership of a radio, television, or mobile
phone is systematically related to farming or management skills and ability, then
we would expect farmers without these tools to have relatively low crop yields.8
We included the average yield variable to control for these innate characteristics of
farmers, which may also affect their price prediction error.
20.3.2.1 Measuring Prediction Error9
We used four alternative, but related, measurements as proxies for smallholders’
price prediction errors (or accuracy). Suppose t and t C1 refer to the current sowing
and the upcoming harvesting periods, whereby the former refers to the time of
production decision. Therefore, t refers to the time when farmers form their price
expectations for the period tC1. Suppose also that e denotes expectation; subscripts
c, i, and v denote crop-, farmer-, and village-specific prices, respectively; n is the
number of crops that a farmer grows and for which they report price expectations.
The alternative measures of a farmer’s price prediction error are defined as follows.
(a) Absolute mean price prediction error (AMPPE)
We measured the AMPPE as the absolute mean deviation of the farmer’s
expected prices from the realized prices in the respective grain markets for n









(b) Relative mean price prediction error (RMPPE)
This is similar to the above measure except that we took the relative mean devi-
ation of farmer’s price expectations from the realized prices in the respective










The above two measurements assume that a farmer gives equal weight to each
crop in his price expectations. However, a farmer may invest more in acquiring
better information regarding a crop that he produces for a market compared
to a crop that he produces for home consumption. This, in turn, affects his
price prediction accuracy of the respective crops. To take this into account,
we calculated the deviation of market share-weighted expected prices from
8A simple linear regression of ownership of assets on past average crop yield supports this
statement: ownership is strongly and positively correlated with crop yield.
9In this study, we refer to the quality of farmers’ price expectations—that is, the deviation of
farmers’ expected prices from realized prices—alternatively as price prediction error (accuracy),
forecasting error (accuracy), and expectation error (precision).
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similarly weighted realized prices. We used the market share of each crop to
calculate price indices for each farmer and district. Using the farmers’ reported
and expected prices for sowing and harvesting periods, we obtain price indices
for the respective seasons. Village-level price indices were similarly calculated
using observed prices in the respective nearby grain markets. Furthermore, we
normalized (both farmer- and district-specific) harvesting time price indices
by the respective sowing time indices in order to consider the general trend
of grain prices. Accounting for such price trends is important to overcome
endogeneity in the estimation that may arise due to heterogeneities in the
farmers’ understanding of the overall inflation or deflation on their price
predictions. Analogous to the two measures of prediction error mentioned
above, we calculated the absolute and relative index price prediction error for
each smallholder farmer.
(c) Absolute index price prediction error (AIPPE)
We calculated the AIPPE as an absolute deviation of indices of farmers’













refers to the normalized price index—where the
denominator (sowing period price) is normalized at 100—for each village v or
for each household i. ˛c refers to the market share of each crop.
(d) Relative index price prediction error (RIPPE)
RIPPE is calculated as the relative deviation of indices of farmers’ expected






Figure 20.2 illustrates how we measured PE using self-reported prices for the
crops of interest in this study. The area in the dotted circle refers to realized
.ptC1/ and expected (pe) prices of the new harvesting period. The latter are price
expectations of farmers made at sowing time, t. The graph in the right panel is a
replication of the corn example for better illustration. The vertical distance between
the realized and expected price, indicated by the red arrow line, is the prediction
error.
The above measures of price prediction error combine multiple crops that a
farmer grows. This might result in an “averaging-out” effect if a farmer who has
a large expectation error for one crop tends to have a small error for the other.
In other words, these measures are inadequate if a farmer’s price forecasts have
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Fig. 20.2 Illustration of prediction error using self-reported prices
Table 20.3 Consistency of
farmers’ prediction errors
between crops
Crop-to-crop errors Reg. coef. Corr. coef.
Barley and wheat 0.49*** 0.38***
(0.10)
Corn and sorghum 0.82*** 0.47***
(0.16)
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses
** denotes statistical significance at the 1 % level or less
large discrepancies across different crops. In order to shed some light on this,
we computed regression and correlation coefficients between the magnitudes of
individual farmer’s forecasting errors for corn to that of sorghum and for wheat
to that of barley.10
The coefficients in Table 20.3 illustrate a significant degree of consistency in
prediction errors between crops for the same farmer. The farmers who made large
errors in their corn price prediction also tended to make large errors for sorghum.
This is also true for the expectation errors of farmers growing both wheat and barley.
This hinted that the mean deviation would not cause the error for one crop to be
offset by the error for another, suggesting also that crop diversification would not
lead to any better resource allocation for the farmer.
Moreover, the data showed that the crop-specific price forecasting (prediction)
errors, on average, range between 19 and 20 % with comparable standard errors.
This provided an additional clue for the absence of any large systematic difference
in the difficulty of forecasting prices of different crops. There is also an economy of
scale advantage for a farmer to invest in acquiring information on multiple crops.
10We chose these crops because of the larger number of farmers producing the respective crop
pairs.
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Variable Original IHS Transformed
Mean (SD) Mean (SD)
AMPPE 141.84 (80.74) 5.38 (1.00)
AIPPE 18.73 (13.28) 3.28 (0.97)
RMPPE 0.18 (0.10) 0.18 (0.10)
RIPPE 0.17 (0.12) 0.17 (0.12)
21
Fig. 20.3 Summary statistics and distribution of the dependent variable
20.3.2.2 Estimation Technique
The nature of the dependent variable (price prediction error), an absolute value of
a narrowly dispersed variable, requires paying special attention to the estimation
method used. Because the prediction error has a zero lower bound, it has a positively
skewed distribution (Fig. 20.3, Panel 1). This variable has a relatively small range,
0–0.6 with a mean close to zero, in the relative measures. As measured by RIPPE,
for instance, the magnitudes of the prediction error made by smallholder farmers
in our sample ranges from 0 % to as far as 60 %, with a mean value of 17 %
(Fig. 20.3, Panel 2). This indicates that some farmers forecasted prices correctly,
and the dependent variable has natural zero values. A quasi-maximum likelihood
(QML) Poisson estimator would be appropriate in such situations (Cameron and
Trivedi 2010; Nichols 2010; Wooldridge 2010). In fact, Santos Silva and Tenreyro
(2006) argued that QML Poisson regression is preferred to an ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression on a log-linear equation regardless of a count or a continuous
dependent variable.11 Because the mean and the variance of our dependent variables
are not equal—that is, the distribution is not Poisson—we needed to use the robust
sandwich standard errors (Cameron 2009).
An OLS estimation can be used if the residuals are normally distributed. We
transformed the alternative dependent variables using the inverse hyperbolic sine
(IHS) method to get residuals that are approximately symmetrically distributed.12
We favored using IHS over logarithmic transformation as some households in our
sample have zero prediction errors, the log of which is not defined.13 The IHS
is a logarithmic-like transformation that retains zero and negative values, unlike
11We refer to an interesting Stata Blog post by Bill Gould about using a Poisson regression model
(http://blog.stata.com).
12The IHS transformation of variable x can be given as: ihs.x/ D ln
D
x C 2x2 C 1	1=2E and the
scale parameter  is assumed to be unity in most applications.
13Because the dependent variable (when measured in relative terms) is not a proportion where
values above one are infeasible, a logit transformation is not needed for an OLS estimation.
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logarithmic transformation, and has been applied in several studies (Bellemare et al.
2013; Burbidge et al. 1988; Moss and Shonkwiler 1993). This transformation allows
us to interpret the OLS estimated coefficients as semi-elasticities. The marginal
effects should be interpreted in percentage points in the case of the relative measures
of the dependent variable (RMPPE and RIPPE).
20.4 Results and Discussion
Table 20.4 presents the estimation results of the maximum-likelihood Poisson
regression model, specified as a generalized linear model (GLM) with a log-link
function. The four columns differ in terms of the alternative measurements of
prediction error, as discussed above. Although results are mostly consistent across
the different specifications, we discuss the results from our preferred measure
of prediction accuracy: the RIPPE. Besides accounting for the general grain
price trend, this measure also weights crop prices with their respective market
shares.
Controlling for access to ICT and grain markets, and other confounders, the
estimated coefficients indicated that female-headed households had more accurate
price expectations than male-headed households. Moreover, as expected a priori,
households with an older (more experienced) head had statistically significant
smaller forecasting errors. Not surprisingly, the precision of smallholders’ price
expectations was closely linked with the self-reported proxy for time preference
(i.e., the discount rate). The results in Table 20.4 show that smallholders with higher
discount rates, who tend to undervalue future gains and who therefore invest less in
production but also information acquisition, have larger forecasting errors. This is
consistent with the implication of the theoretical model.
As expected a priori, smallholders who had access to ICT such as radios, televi-
sions, or mobile phones were more likely to make more precise price expectations
than those who do not own any of these assets. Ownership of these assets enables
them to access additional information on prices cheaply. More specifically, access
to ICT was associated with about a 10 % decrease in the conditional mean of a
smallholder’s prediction error (100  e0:11  1, in column [4] of Table 20.4).
This means that the prediction error made by smallholder farmers who own any
of the ICT tools was smaller by a factor of 0.89 than those who did not own any
ICT tools, ceteris paribus. Smallholders who followed price information through
radio or television or mobile telephony tended to forecast prices more accurately.
This finding supports the theoretical model that indicates a negative impact of large
information costs on the quality of the price signal. The interaction variable (ICT
ownership and source of price information, ICT  InfoSource) is not statistically
significant in all specifications. This indicates that information assets might have
improved a farmer’s price prediction accuracy mainly through access to non-price
information, such as weather.
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Table 20.4 Factors that affect price prediction accuracy of smallholders
Dependent variable: relative mean/index price prediction error
Variables AMPPE AIPPE RMPPE RIPPE
Male head 0.0328*** 0.1089** 0.0353 0.1090**
(0.0120) (0.0460) (0.0300) (0.0430)
Age of head 0.0004 0.0027** 0.0007** 0.0026***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0000) (0.0010)
Family size 0.0108*** 0.0054 0.0112*** 0.0067
(0.0030) (0.0110) (0.0020) (0.0100)
Head’s years of schooling 0.0049 0.0001 0.0052*** 0.0008
(0.0030) (0.0060) (0.0020) (0.0050)
ICT 0.0240 0.1117*** 0.0557** 0.1074***
(0.0300) (0.0410) (0.0280) (0.0260)
ICT  InfoSource 0.0344 0.0885 0.0207 0.0724
(0.0660) (0.0610) (0.0470) (0.0620)
Past average crop yield 0.0090 0.0525 0.0028 0.0478
(0.0310) (0.0600) (0.0230) (0.0370)
Share of farm income 0.0822 0.0667 0.0587 0.0429
(0.0990) (0.1690) (0.1830) (0.1810)
Market share 0.0929 0.2323 0.1631*** 0.2591
(0.0850) (0.1460) (0.0530) (0.1700)
Per capita livestock value 0.0177*** 0.0185*** 0.0158*** 0.0185***
(0.0040) (0.0050) (0.0050) (0.0050)
Per capita farm size 0.0307 0.0061 0.0043 0.0034
(0.1320) (0.1440) (0.1490) (0.1340)
Dist. to grain market 0.0047 0.0301*** 0.0029 0.0296***
(0.0030) (0.0040) (0.0070) (0.0050)
Dist. to extension agents’ office 0.0042 0.0207 0.0032 0.0198
(0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0100) (0.0190)
Discount rate 0.0350*** 0.0227*** 0.0378*** 0.0201**
(0.0080) (0.0070) (0.0060) (0.0090)
No. of crops 0.0706 0.1092*** 0.1038*** 0.1042***
(0.0430) (0.0350) (0.0220) (0.0260)
Constant 4.7818*** 3.9814*** 1.7674*** 0.8357**
(0.2980) (0.6110) (0.2040) (0.3950)
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 400 400 400 400
Notes: Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered in seven kebeles (villages)
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively
We included two proxy variables for wealth, per capita value of livestock and
farm size, to take into account any possibility that richer smallholders may have
had better price forecasts using information from channels other than the afore-
mentioned information assets. The results confirmed that (regardless of ownership
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of information assets) wealthier farmers have better price forecasts, as indicated
by the statistically significant and negative estimated coefficient of the per capita
value of livestock value. The lagged historical crop yield variable, which captures
poor farming skills and management ability of farmers, turned out to be statistically
insignificant. Although farmers who do not own ICT may share such common
farmer characteristics, these innate characteristics did not have a causal effect on
their price forecasting accuracy.
Another important factor which determines the cost of access to information is
the proximity of households to major local grain markets. The empirical finding is
consistent with the theoretical model: the costs of acquiring information were higher
for households located farther away from grain markets. All other factors remaining
constant, halving the “effective” distance to a nearby grain market reduces the
forecasting error of a farmer who is located at an average distance away from
the market by about 14 % (100  e4:730:03  1). This is consistent with the
descriptive statistics as most households reported that they had usually visited
nearby grain markets to obtain price information. In contrast, access to extension
services—measured by distance from extension service offices—did not appear to
be effective in providing information that helps smallholders improve their price
forecasting performance. This may be partly explained by the training level of
extension agents and the extent to which farmers trust the information they receive
from agents.
We measured “access to ICT” by ownership of any of the information assets,
namely radio, television, or mobile phone. It may, however, be necessary to
investigate the differential impacts (if any) of each ICT. Table 20.5 presents the
results using an exclusive ownership of mobile phone (column 2) and radio (column
3) as alternative measures of access to information.14 Column (1) in this table is
the same as the last column in Table 20.4, and the dependent variable is RIPPE
in all cases. The results suggest that mobile telephony alone played a statistically
significant role in improving the price forecasting accuracy of farmers. However,
the marginal effect of exclusive ownership of mobile phones is smaller than the
effect of our preferred measure of information access (an estimated coefficient of
0.05). Smallholders may use the information assets as a substitute or complement
depending on several factors. The results also highlighted that ownership of a
radio alone did not have a statistically significant effect on price prediction errors
(column 3).
The last column in Table 20.5 controlled for interaction terms to test if the effects
of access to ICT is conditional on some of the covariates (e.g., age and distance
to market). Older household heads have more experience and are more likely to
have better price forecasts, whereas younger heads do better if they have access to
ICT. More specifically, the estimated coefficient of the interaction term of ICT and
age of the head was positive (Column 4). The positive estimated coefficient of the
14Since only less than 10 % of our sample owns a television (8 %) or all three assets (7 %), we
only consider exclusive ownership of a mobile or a radio as alternative proxies for access to ICT.
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Table 20.5 Differential impacts of access to ICT on price prediction (RIPPE)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Male head 0.1090** 0.0937** 0.0973* 0.0957***
(0.0430) (0.0440) (0.0520) (0.0370)
Age of head 0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0025* 0.0092***
(0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010)
ICT  Age 0.0088***
(0.002)
Family size 0.0067 0.0036 0.0032 0.0054
(0.0100) (0.0060) (0.0060) (0.0060)
Head’s years of schooling 0.0008 0.0019 0.0013 0.0021
(0.0050) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0040)
ICTa 0.1074*** 0.0513** 0.0249 0.4494***
(0.0260) (0.0230) (0.0430) (0.1540)
ICT  InfoSource 0.0724 0.0727
(0.0620) (0.0600)
Past average crop yield 0.0478 0.0554 0.0521 0.0378
(0.0370) (0.0640) (0.0700) (0.0700)
Share of farm income 0.0429 0.1386 0.1236 0.0027
(0.1810) (0.1690) (0.1090) (0.1510)
Market share 0.2591 0.2433 0.2406 0.2594
(0.1700) (0.1930) (0.1590) (0.1630)
Per capita livestock value 0.0185*** 0.0182*** 0.0174*** 0.0199***
(0.0050) (0.0030) (0.0050) (0.0060)
Per capita farm size 0.0034 0.0222 0.0219 0.0036
(0.1340) (0.1530) (0.1060) (0.1260)
Dist. to grain market 0.0296*** 0.0296*** 0.0296*** 0.0417***
(0.0050) (0.0040) (0.0040) (0.0060)
ICT  dist. to market 0.0145*
(0.008)
Dist. to extension agents’ office 0.0198 0.0164 0.0175 0.0218*
(0.0190) (0.0100) (0.0170) (0.0120)
Discount rate 0.0201** 0.0184*** 0.0184*** 0.0204***
(0.0090) (0.0060) (0.0070) (0.0070)
No. of crops 0.1042*** 0.1078*** 0.1109*** 0.0970***
(0.0260) (0.0280) (0.0290) (0.0370)
Constant 0.8357** 0.7023 0.7423 0.6864
(0.3950) (0.5420) (0.6500) (0.6620)
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 400 400 400 400
Notes: Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered in seven kebeles (villages)
*, **, *** denote statistical significance a 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively
aAccess to ICT is measured as ownership of either a phone, radio, or TV in (1 & 4), only a phone
in (2), only a radio in (3)
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interaction term indicates that ownership of ICT tools has larger impacts on price
prediction accuracy for households headed by younger farmers. This can be due
to better knowledge of younger farmers with regard to using ICT tools and better
understanding of the transmitted information.
Another interesting finding is that proximity to grain markets did not provide any
more advantage in terms of predicting future prices as long as farmers have access
to ICT. The estimated coefficient of the interaction term of ICT and distance from
nearby grain markets was negative and statistically significant. In other words, the
beneficial impact of ICT on price forecasting is stronger for smallholders located
farther away from grain markets. Based on the estimated coefficients, the beneficial
impact of access to ICT on price forecasting accuracy outweighs the detrimental
impact of access to grain markets for farmers located as far as 15 km away
from grain markets. This is because the interaction term indicates that prediction
error increased by a factor of e0:03 D e0:040:01	 D 1:03 for every kilometer
increase in distance to markets (an increase by this factor for every 15 km is
approximately equal to the decrease in prediction error because of ownership of
ICT). This suggests that ownership of information assets can serve as an alternative
way to gain access to market information for farmers residing far away from
grain markets but not for those located more than 15 km away. Ceteris paribus,
simultaneously providing access to ICT and halving the “effective” distance to
nearby grain markets, improved the prediction accuracy of farmers by as much as
45 % (100  ef0:45C.4:730:03/g  1/.
20.4.1 Robustness Checks
We estimated Eq. (20.7) using an OLS method on the IHS-transformed variables.
The results are reported in Tables 20.7 and 20.8 in Appendix. The OLS results were
largely consistent with the ML Poisson estimation results.15 The control variables
in our empirical model explained only a small but significant proportion of the vari-
ation in the farmers’ forecasting errors.16 Ethiopia is one of the countries in which
agricultural commodity prices have experienced significant variability in recent
years (Rashid 2011; Tadesse and Guttormsen 2011). High price volatility reduces
the accuracy of producers’ and consumers’ forecasts of crop prices (Binswanger
and Rosenzweig 1986), even though the impact is ambiguous in our theoretical
model. Given the stochasticity of output prices, a lucky farmer gets his expected
15Note that comparison of OLS and Poisson regression coefficients is inappropriate as they are












the GLM regression and compare them with the corresponding OLS coefficients.
16The coefficients of determination, computed as a square of the correlation coefficients of the
respective fitted and actual prediction error values, are comparable to the reported R-square in the
OLS regression results.
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price close to the actual value. Thus, the ‘luck factor’ could probably explain some
of the remaining variation of smallholders’ forecasting errors. There also appears
to be a widespread exchange of price and other information among households,
thereby suggesting that the private information of a farmer who has the most timely
and relevant information could be open to the public domain.
As a further robustness check, we employed a maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) technique with normal distribution to simultaneously estimate the mean
price and its heteroskedastic variance term. In the mean equation, the realized





is the difference between expected and realized price. The variance
of the residual is household-specific and normally distributed; it measures the
forecasting error of the household. In the variance equation, the log variance was
estimated conditional on the same set of explanatory variables X as before. Hence,
the maximum likelihood regression reads:
pic;tC1 D ˛ C ˇpeic;t C "i; (20.8a)
ln i D ac C X0: (20.8b)
The maximum likelihood estimation results are reported in Table 20.6. We first
observed that farmers have unbiased price expectations (at least in the year of our
survey) as ˛ was not statistically different from zero. Furthermore, the results for
the variance regression were mostly consistent with both the QML Poisson and
OLS estimation results.
20.5 Conclusions
A time lag between production decisions and output realization is intrinsic in
agriculture; therefore, price expectations play a crucial role in the production,
marketing, and agricultural technology adoption decisions of a farmer. The literature
widely explores the effect of access to information—in particular access to market
information systems, and to information and communication technologies—on a
variety of economic variables, at both a macro and a micro level. The current study
complements the existing literature by investigating the role of access to information
on the precision of smallholders’ price expectations. Producers invest money and
time in searching for price and other information, which they believe would improve
their price expectations. This process is costly for an individual farmer. The cost of
information is therefore crucial for farmers in deciding on their level of investment
17This approach relies on empirical tests for unbiased or rational expectations, as typically used
for assessing efficiency on commodity markets. See, e.g., Algieri and Kalkuhl (2014). Rational
expectations are usually tested against ˛ ¤ 0 and ˇ ¤ 1.
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Table 20.6 Factors that affect price prediction accuracy of smallholders, MLE
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Equation 1: Observed market price (ln) is the dependent variable




Equation 2: Ln (sigma) serves as a proxy for the natural log of prediction error
Male head 0.0649* 0.0560* 0.0563* 0.0712**
(0.0338) (0.0335) (0.0335) (0.0343)
Age of head 0.0024** 0.0023** 0.0022** 0.0034*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.0019)
ICT  age 0.0011
(0.0022)
Family size 0.0073 0.0118* 0.0126* 0.0107
(0.0071) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.0072)
Head’s years of schooling 0.0055 0.0051 0.0056 0.0045
(0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0057)
ICTa 0.0882** 0.0664** 0.0265 0.0946**
(0.0432) (0.0302) (0.0442) (0.0409)
ICT  InfoSource 0.0198 0.1682
(0.0343) (0.1842)
Past average crop yield 0.0227 0.0230 0.0234 0.0281
(0.0324) (0.0321) (0.0324) (0.0384)
Share of farm income 0.0653 0.0402 0.0207 0.0713
(0.2000) (0.1004) (0.1002) (0.1126)
Market share 0.0591 0.1112 0.1129 0.0882
(0.1069) (0.1055) (0.1052) (0.1099)
Per capita livestock value 0.0120** 0.0140** 0.0135** 0.0154**
(0.0061) (0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0062)
Per capita farm size 0.0326 0.0129 0.0115 0.0296
(0.0644) (0.0624) (0.0626) (0.0658)
Dist. to grain market 0.0080* 0.0084* 0.0087* 0.0336***
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0125)
ICT  dist. to market 0.0277**
(0.0129)
Dist. to extension agents’ office 0.0075 0.0047 0.0067 0.008
(0.0065) (0.0066) (0.0065) (0.0065)
Discount rate 0.0304 0.0222 0.0243 0.0246
(0.0187) (0.0170) (0.0171) (0.0174)
No. of crops 0.2656*** 0.2668*** 0.2603*** 0.2670***
(0.0159) (0.0161) (0.0157) (0.0159)
(continued)
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Table 20.6 (continued)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant 2.3036*** 2.2150*** 2.2116*** 2.8668***
(0.3390) (0.2726) (0.2747) (0.3285)
District dummy Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald chi2 test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
N 2394 2400 2400 2394
Notes: *, **, *** denote statistical significance a 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively
aAccess to ICT is measured as ownership of either a phone, radio, or TV in (1 & 4), only a phone
in (2), only a radio in (3)
in information acquisition. In this study, we employed access to ICT and distance
to markets as measures of costs of acquiring information. The theoretical model,
which has been explained in Sect. 20.2, unambiguously showed that the level of
farmer’s investment in acquiring information is negatively influenced by the costs
of accessing information.
Using a primary survey dataset that elicits smallholders’ price expectations for
the next harvesting period, we empirically evaluated the impact of access to ICT
and grain markets and other variables of interest on smallholders’ price prediction
accuracy. The findings suggest that farmers who have access to ICT and who
reside closer to grain markets have smaller forecasting error margins, supporting
the implications of the theoretical model. This calls for improving the information
and physical infrastructure in rural areas of the country in order to reduce costs
of obtaining information. The beneficial effect of access to ICT was larger for
households that reside farther away from grain markets and for those headed by
relatively younger farmers. From a policy perspective, these differential impacts are
compelling as younger farmers and farmers living farther away from grain markets
are among the households that hold larger potential for increasing agricultural
productivity in the country. This is because farm plots that are located very close
to markets are highly degraded, and older farmers are less willing to adopt new
technologies.
In agreement with the theoretical model, the empirical findings showed that
farmers with higher discount rates were more likely to have larger forecasting errors.
This has implications for assisting farmers in reducing future price and income
uncertainties, and for enhancing their risk-management strategies. There are some
institutions such as the Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise (EGTE), the Ethiopian
Commodity Exchange (ECX), and the Agricultural Transformation Agency (ATA)
that could potentially improve smallholders’ access to market information in the
country. These institutions may assist farmers in providing and disseminating
reliable and timely central wholesale prices.
Access to extension agents did not have any statistically significant contribution
to improving price prediction accuracy of farmers in our sample. Extension agents
in Ethiopia serve more as a source of credit and inputs rather than a source of
information on optimal input use and market information (Spielman et al. 2012).
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Extension service, with agents who have valuable market information and better
knowledge of how to use inputs than rural farmers, is important for improving
the production decision of smallholders. However, past research has shown that
Ethiopian extension agents have little practical experience and poor communication
skills (Belay and Abebaw 2004). This could explain why farmers may not trust
extension agents and hence do not adopt their advice. Because the Ethiopian
government is expanding the extension service program throughout the country, it is
important to consider disseminating reliable price and market information through
extension services in the country to farmers with limited access to such information.
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Appendix. OLS Estimation Results
Table 20.7 Factors that affect price prediction accuracy of smallholders
Dependent variable: relative mean/index price prediction error
Variables AMPPE AIPPE RMPPE RIPPE
Male head 0.1121** 0.1590** 0.0059 0.0186***
(0.0551) (0.0622) (0.0037) (0.0043)
Age of head 0.0009 0.0039* 0.0001 0.0004**
(0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0001) (0.0002)
Family size 0.0068 0.0029 0.0020*** 0.0009
(0.005) (0.008) (0.0006) (0.0008)
Head’s years of schooling 0.004 0.0168*** 0.0012*** 0.0004
(0.0085) (0.0060) (0.0004) (0.0006)
ICT 0.0682*** 0.0435 0.0102** 0.0182***
(0.0245) (0.1080) (0.0043) (0.0068)
ICT  InfoSource 0.0474 0.0176 0.0028 0.0123
(0.0757) (0.1569) (0.0097) (0.0092)
Past average crop yield 0.1102* 0.0194 0.0003 0.0085
(0.0613) (0.1254) (0.0064) (0.0089)
Share of farm income 0.1538 0.0625 0.0085 0.0092
(0.2139) (0.2765) (0.0275) (0.0298)
Market share 0.1091 0.0273 0.0308*** 0.0328
(0.1015) (0.1788) (0.0116) (0.0315)
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Table 20.7 (continued)
Dependent variable: relative mean/index price prediction error
Variables AMPPE AIPPE RMPPE RIPPE
Per capita livestock value 0.0132*** 0.0079 0.0031*** 0.0026***
(0.0051) (0.0097) (0.001) (0.0007)
Per capita farm size 0.0044 0.0264 0.0001 0.0009
(0.1041) (0.1234) (0.0245) (0.0254)
Dist. to grain market 0.0158** 0.0261** 0.0005 0.0054***
(0.0076) (0.0130) (0.0006) (0.0012)
Dist. to extension agents’ office 0.0111 0.0268 0.0008 0.0039
(0.0151) (0.0432) (0.0022) (0.0033)
Discount rate 0.1011*** 0.0376*** 0.0072*** 0.0031***
(0.0184) (0.0109) (0.0014) (0.0010)
No. of crops 0.1169** 0.1324** 0.0208*** 0.0169***
(0.0484) (0.0520) (0.0057) (0.0060)
Constant 6.1571*** 4.2603*** 0.1646*** 0.3296***
(0.4752) (1.1827) (0.0623) (0.0925)
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald chi2 test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Root MSE 0.912 0.913 0.095 0.111
Adjusted R-square 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.20
N 400 400 400 400
Notes: Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered in seven kebeles (villages)
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively. Note that
since the dependent variable is either IHS-transformed (APPME & AIPPE) or expressed as a ratio
(RMPPE & RIPPE), the coefficients can be considered as economically relevant
Table 20.8 Differential impacts of access to ICT on price prediction
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Male head 0.0186*** 0.0164** 0.0169*** 0.0171**
(0.0043) (0.0070) (0.0062) (0.0087)
Age of head 0.0004** 0.0004*** 0.0004** 0.0017***
(0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002)
ICT  age 0.0016***
(0.0002)
Family size 0.0009 0.0005 0.0004 0.0008
(0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0013) (0.0014)
Head’s years of schooling 0.0004 0.0006 0.0005 0.0000
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0008) (0.0005)
ICTa 0.0182*** 0.0082* 0.0047 0.0851***
(0.0068) (0.0045) (0.0050) (0.0233)
(continued)
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Table 20.8 (continued)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Past average crop yield 0.0085 0.0092 0.0086 0.0070
(0.0089) (0.0106) (0.0080) (0.0105)
Share of farm income 0.0092 0.0263 0.0241 0.0046
(0.0298) (0.0284) (0.0205) (0.0284)
Market share 0.0328 0.0326 0.0324 0.0332
(0.0315) (0.0285) (0.0270) (0.0212)
Per capita livestock value 0.0026*** 0.0026*** 0.0025*** 0.0028***
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0009)
Per capita farm size 0.0009 0.0022 0.0019 0.0012
(0.0254) (0.0259) (0.0155) (0.0249)
Dist. to grain market 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0054*** 0.0075***
(0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0009) (0.0015)
ICT  dist. to market 0.0026**
(0.0013)
Dist. to extension agents’ office 0.0039 0.0033* 0.0035** 0.0042**
(0.0033) (0.0019) (0.0016) (0.0021)
Discount rate 0.0031*** 0.0029*** 0.0029** 0.0031***
(0.0010) (0.0011) (0.0012) (0.0010)
No. of crops 0.0169*** 0.0174*** 0.0179*** 0.0156**
(0.0060) (0.0048) (0.0061) (0.0061)
Constant 0.3296*** 0.3473*** 0.3419*** 0.3666***
(0.0925) (0.0926) (0.0784) (0.1150
District dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Wald chi2 test (p-value) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Root MSE 0.111 0.111 0.111 0.111
Adjusted R-square 0.20 0.15 0.15 0.21
N 400 400 400 400
Notes: Standard errors are bootstrapped and clustered in seven kebeles (villages)
*, **, *** denote statistical significance at 10 %, 5 %, and 1 % level, respectively
aAccess to ICT is measured as the ownership of either a phone, radio, or TV in (1 and 4), only a
phone in (2), only a radio in (3)
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